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Introduction
The incompatibility between strategy-proofness and non-dictatorship is a major issue in social choice. The seminal result of Gibbard (1977) and Satterthwaite (1975) states that a surjective and strategy-proof social choice function (scf) with a range of at least three alternatives, defined over the complete domain, is dictatorial. Aswal et al. (2003) show that the assumption of a complete domain is far from being necessary for this result. They show that a large class of domains (including several that are "small") are dictatoriali.e. domains with the property that all strategy-proof and unanimous scfs (with a range of at least three) defined over such domains, are dictatorial. A complete characterization of dictatorial domains is a natural objective but appears to difficult to provide. Our goal in this paper is to generalize the sufficiency result of Aswal et al. (2003) and unify existing results in the area.
It will be helpful to briefly recount the result of Aswal et al. (2003) . Fix an arbitrary domain. They say that two alternatives a and b are connected if there exists a preference in the domain where a is ranked first and b, second and another preference where the reverse is true. They consider the following graph: each alternative is a vertex and there is an edge between a pair of vertices if the two alternatives represented by the vertices, are connected. A domain is linked if this graph is "sufficiently dense". Specifically, there should exist an arrangement of the vertices such that the first three are mutually connected and each vertex is connected to at least two in the set of vertices that precedes it. Their main result is that every linked domain is dictatorial. They show the existence of a variety of linked domains including those that are linear in the number of alternatives. However, this result is far from a characterization -for instance, the circular domains defined in Sato (2010) and are not linked.
We generalize the linked domain result in two ways. The first way is to weaken the notion of connectedness between a pair of alternatives to weak connectedness while retaining the "connection structure" of the induced graph as in linkedness. The second way is to strengthen the notion of connectedness to strong connectedness but weakening the "connection structure" on the induced graph.
Two alternatives a and b are weakly connected if there exists a (possibly empty) set of alternatives B and four orderings in the domain such that there is a reversal between B and b when a is top-ranked and there is a reversal between B and a when b is top-ranked. Reversality requires alternatives between a and b to belong to B in the case where B is better than b. Similarly, alternatives between b and a to belong to B in the case where B is better than a. A domain is called a β domain if we can arrange all the alternatives (vertices in the induced graph) in a way that the first three are mutually weakly connected and each alternative is weakly connected to at least two in the set of alternatives (vertices) that precedes it. Our first result is that β domains are dictatorial. These domains are obviously supersets of linked domains -it is also possible to find β domains that are smaller than any linked domain.
Strong connectedness between a and b requires the following "intermediateness" property in addition to weak connectedness: for any alternative c other than a and b, there exists two orderings in the domain, one where c is above b while a at the top and another where c is above a while b at the top. A domain is called a γ domain if its induced graph is connected in the usual graph-theoretic sense, i.e. there exists a path between any two alternatives(vertices). Our second result is that all γ domains whose induced graph is not a star-graph, are dictatorial domains. The same result holds in the star-graph case with mild additional conditions. These results generalize results on circular domains in Sato (2010) and Chatterji and Sen (2011) . Finally, we apply our result to a facility location problem in a restricted environment.
The paper is organized as followed. Section 2 contains a description of the model. Sections 3 and 4 contain the results on β and γ domains respectively. Section 5 provides an application while Section 6 concludes.
Basic notation and definitions
Let A = {a 1 , . . . , a m } denote a finite set of alternatives with m ≥ 3. Let I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2 be a finite set of agents. Let P denote the set of strict orderings 1 of the elements of A. An admissible domain is a set D ⊂ P. A typical preference orderings will be denoted by P i where aP i b will signify that a is preferred (strictly) to b under P i . A preference profile is an element of the set D n . Preference profiles will be denoted by P,P , P ′ etc and their i th components as P i ,P i , P ′ i respectively with i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let (P i , P −i ) denote the preference profile where the i th component of the profile P is replaced byP i .
For an ordering P i ∈ D and a j ∈ A, we let B(a j , P i ) denote the set of alternatives that are strictly better than a j according to P i , while W (a j , P i ) denotes the set of alternatives that are strictly worse than a j according to P i . Let M (a j , a k , P i ) be the set alternatives that are strictly worse than a j and strictly better than a k according to P i .
Some familiar properties of scfs are stated below.
If an alternative is top-ranked by all voters, the scf must pick that alternative. A scf is strategy-proof if no voter can obtain a strictly better alternative by misrepresenting her preferences for any announcements of preferences of the other voters.
A scf f is strategy-proof if it is not manipulable by any agent at any profile.
A scf is a dictatorship if a particular voter always gets her best alternative.
The following well-known result provides a full characterization of strategy-proof scfs for the domain P.
Theorem 1 (Gibbard (1977) , Satterthwaite (1975) 
is strategy-proof and satisfies unanimity if and only if it is dictatorial.
Unfortunately, there is a large class of preference domains where strategy-proofness implies dictatorship, so that there is no escape from this unpleasant dilemma. These domains which we define formally below, are the objects of our study.
A is strategyproof and satisfies unanimity implies f is dictatorial.
Throughout the paper, we shall restrict attention to domains that are minimally rich.
The minimal richness assumption guarantees that every alternative is top-ranked for some ordering in the domain. This is a standard assumption in the literature, for instance Aswal et al. (2003) .
β Domains
We first introduce the notion of weak connectedness. In what follows, we fix a domain D ⊂ P. 
. . . Table 1 : Weak connectedness
The weak connectedness concept is illustrated below. The idea is quite simple. There exists a set B such that there is a reversal between B and a k when a j is top-ranked and there is a reversal between B and a j when a k is top-ranked. Reversality requires all alternatives between a j and a k to belong to B in the case where B is better than a k . Similarly, all alternatives between a k and a j to belong to B in the case where B is better than a j .
Observation 1 In case B is the empty set, weak connectedness reduces to connectedness in the sense of Aswal et al. (2003) .
A β domain can be defined in the same way that a linked domain was defined in Aswal et al. (2003) . 
By virtue of Observation 1, linked domains are β domain. However, the converse is not true as the example below shows.
Example 1 Let A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 } and letD be the domain in Table 2 . It is clear that a 1 is connected to a 2 and a 3 , a 2 is connected to a 3 , but a 4 is not connected to any other alternatives. ThereforeD is not linked. But it is a β domain because a 4 w ∼ a 1 and a 4 w ∼ a 2 .
It is helpful to interpret a β domain in terms of the graphs induced by weak connectedness. Let D be a domain. The graph G(D) is defined as follows: the vertices of the graph are the alternatives and two vertices have an edge iff the alternatives represented by the vertices are weakly connected. The graph induced by the domain in Example 1 is shown in Figure 1 .
Our first Theorem shows that the linked domain result in Aswal et al. (2003) can be generalized to β domains. 
Proof : Let D be a β domain and assume without loss of generality that the function σ in definition 9 is the identity function. For every non-empty X ⊂ A, we let such that r 1 (P 1 ), r 1 (P 2 ) ∈ {a, b} .
Proof : Suppose not. Let a and b be the first ranked outcomes according to P 1 and P 2 respectively with f (P ) = c where c = a, b. Note that a and b must also be distinct from each other, otherwise we immediately contradict unanimity. Since a
. We consider two cases.
Case 1: B = ∅. By replicating the arguments in Claim A in Sen (2001) , we can show that f (P ) ∈ {a, b}. This leads to a contradiction.
. Otherwise 2 would manipulate via an ordering where a is ranked first, thereby obtaining the outcome a (unanimity). We consider the following two cases.
, otherwise 1 would manipulate via an ordering where b is ranked first, thereby obtaining the outcome b (unanimity). Therefore, f (P
via an ordering where a is ranked first, thereby obtaining the outcome a (unanimity). If
2 ) via an ordering where b is ranked first, thereby obtaining the outcome b (unanimity). Therefore f (P
via an ordering where a is ranked first, thereby obtaining the outcome a (unanimity).
This leads to a contradiction.
Our proof consists in establishing the following two steps.
Step 1: Let X = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 }. There exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that f (P ) = r 1 (P j ) for all
Step 2: LetX = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a l−1 } and
We proceed to establish Step 1 through a sequence of claims. First note that since D is a β domain and σ is the identity function, we have a 1
2 such that r 1 (P 1 ) = a 1 and r 1 (P 2 ) = a 2 . LetP 1 andP 2 be such that r 1 (P 1 ) = a 1 , r 1 (P 2 ) = a 2 and w.l.o.g. we assume that f (P 1 ,P 2 ) = a 1 . We complete Step 1 by showing that agent 1 is the dictator. By Lemma 1 and strategy-proofness, f (P 1 , P 2 ) = a 1 for all P ∈ D 2 where r 1 (P 1 ) = a 1 and r 1 (P 2 ) = a 2 . The following pair of claims are required to establish Step 1.
Claim 1 For all P ∈ D 2 where r 1 (P 1 ) = a 3 and r 1 (P 2 ) = a 2 , f (P 1 , P 2 ) = a 3 .
Proof : Suppose not. Then, there exists (P
By lemma 1 and strategy-proofness,
with r 1 (P 1 ) = a 3 and r 1 (P 2 ) = a 2 . Since a 3 w ∼ a 1 , there exists B ⊂ A, P ′′ 1 , and P * 1 such that r 1 (P
Otherwise, agent 1 would manipulate via an ordering where a 1 is ranked first -a contradiction. If
Otherwise, agent 1 would manipulate via an ordering where a 1 is ranked first -a contradiction.
Claim 2 For all P ∈ D 2 where r 1 (P 1 ) = a 1 and r 1 (P 2 ) = a 3 , f (P 1 , P 2 ) = a 1 .
By Lemma 1 and strategy-proofness, f (P 1 , P 2 ) = a 3 for all (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ D 2 with r 1 (P 1 ) = a 1 and r 1 (P 2 ) = a 3 . Since a 3 w ∼ a 2 , there exists B ⊂ A, P ′′ 2 , and P * 2 such that r 1 (P
Otherwise, agent 2 would manipulate via an ordering where a 3 is ranked first -a contradiction.
Using the arguments used in the proof of Claim 1 and 2, it is straightforward to show that f (P ) = r 1 (P 1 ) for all P ∈ D X × D X . This establishes Step 1.
We now turn to Step 2. Pick an integer l in the set {4, . . . , m}. We state our induction hypothesis below.
Induction Hypothesis (IH): f (P ) = r 1 (P 1 ) for all P ∈ DX × DX.
Our objective is to show that f (P ) = r 1 (P 1 ) for all P ∈ D X * × D X * . Claim 3 For all
(a i and a j are as specified in (*)).
Proof : Suppose not. There exists an (
Therefore by Lemma 1, f (P 1 ,P 2 ) = r 1 (P 2 ). Let r 1 (P 2 ) = a i -a similar argument holds if r 1 (P 2 ) = a j . Since a l w ∼ a j , there exists an ordering P * 1 such that (i) r 1 (P * 1 ) = a l and (ii) a j P * 1 a i . By Lemma 1 and strategy-proofness f (P * 1 ,P 2 ) = a i . Note that agent 1 would manipulate at (P * 1 ,P 2 ) via an ordering P ′ 1 where r 1 (P ′ 1 ) = a j because by induction hypothesis f (P
Claim 4 For all (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ D 2 such that P 1 ∈ D a l and P 2 ∈ DX, f (P ) = r 1 (P 1 ).
Proof : In the view of Claim 3, we need to consider only the case where P 2 ∈ D ar where a r ∈ {a 1 , . . . , a l−1 } and a r = a i , a j . Suppose there exists (P 1 ,P 2 ) such that r 1 (P 1 ) = a l , r 1 (P 2 ) = a r and f (P 1 , Claim 5 For all (P 1 , P 2 ) ∈ D 2 such that P 1 ∈ D {a i ,a j } and P 2 ∈ D a l , f (P ) = r 1 (P 1 ) (here too, a i and a j are as specified in (*)).
Proof : Suppose not. There exists an ( Claim 7 For all a r ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a l−1 }, P 1 ∈ D ar and P 2 ∈ D a l , f (P 1 , P 2 ) = a r .
Proof : Pick a r ∈ {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a l−1 }. Since D is a β domain, there must exist a sequence
where P 1 ∈ D a j and P 2 ∈ D a l . Applying Claim 6 repeatedly, it follows that f (P ) = a r for all P ∈ D 2 where P 1 ∈ D ar and P 2 ∈ D a l .
Claims 3-7 establish Step 2. This completes the proof of the Theorem.
Observation 2 Aswal et al. (2003) proved that linked domains are dictatorial. Since linked domains are β domain, Theorem 2 clearly generalizes that of Aswal et al. (2003) . We note that β domain can be much smaller than linked domains. For instance, the domain in Example 1 has eight orderings while the minimal linked domain with four alternatives has ten orderings. In fact, the size of a minimal dictatorial domain is 2m, the bound that is obtained by β domains in the case where m = 4.
γ Domains
In this section, we consider a strengthening of the notion of weak connectedness. This generates new conditions for dictatorial domains where the induced graph on alternatives has fewer edges. We introduce the notion of strong connectedness formally below. In addition to weak connectedness, strong connectedness requires the following "intermediateness" property : for any alternative a r other than a j and a k , there exist two orderings in the domain, one where a r is above a k while a j at the top and another where a r is above a j while a k at the top.
Fix a domain D. The graph induced by strong connectednessḠ(D) is constructed in the same way as G(D) with weak connectedness replaced by strong connectedness. In other words, the set of vertices inḠ(D) is A and there is an edge {a j , a k } inḠ(D) if and only if
The objective of this paper is to show thatḠ(D) requires "fewer" edges than G(D) in order to be dictatorial. In particular, we will only requireḠ(D) to be connected. 2 
Definition 11 A domain D is a γ domain ifḠ(D) is connected.
A γ domain may not be a β domain as the example below shows.
Example 2 Let A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 } and letD be the domain in Table 3 . 1 a 2 a 2 a 3 a 3 a 4 a 4 a 5 a 5  a 2 a 4 a 1 a 4 a 1 a 5 a 5 a 2 a 4 a 1  a 3 a 3 a 3 a 5 a 2 a 4 a 3 a 1 a 3 a 2  a 4 a 5 a 4 a 3 a 4 a 2 a 2 a 3 a 1 a 3  a 5 a 2 a 5 a 1 a 5 a 1 a 1 a 5 a 2 a 4 Table 3: The domainD
The domainD is a γ domain. The induced graphḠ(D) (shown in Figure 2 ) is connected. connected to a 1 or a 2 or a 3 . ThereforeD is not a β domain.
Example 3 Let A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 } and let D * be the domain in Table 4 . The graph induced by D * is a star graph 3 (shown in Figure 3 ). Since the star graph is connected, D * is a γ domain. The the following we show that the circular domain introduced in Sato (2010) 
(Let a m+1 = a 1 and a 0 = a m .)
Proof : First we show that for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, {a k , a k+1 } is an edge inḠ(D c ). Since there exists P ′ , P ′′ ∈ D c where r 1 (P
and r 2 (P ′ i ) = a k , a k and a k+1 are weakly connected. Pick an alternative b = a k , a k+1 . Since there exists P
Observation 3Ḡ(D c ) is not a star graph.
Observation 4 A circular domain may or may not be a β domain. Chatterji and Sen (2011) introduced a more restricted class of circular domains (which they also called circular domains). These domains are β domain.
Observation 5 A β domain may not be a γ domain. For instance the domain in Example 1, is not a γ domain. The induced graph (shown in Figure 4) is not connected. Our main result in this section shows that any D for whichḠ(D) is connected, is dictatorial. Unfortunately, some extra conditions are needed in the very special case whenḠ(D) is a star graph. We are unable to show the dictatorial result for the star graph without additional conditions but we conjecture that the additional conditions are not required. In Parts B and C of the Theorem below, we provide two independent conditions for the star-graph case that ensure dictatoriality.
B. LetḠ(D) be a star graph and let a be the center of the star. If there exists b, c ∈
Proof : Let D be a γ domain and let f : D 2 → A be a strategy-proof and unanimous scf 4 . LetḠ(D) be the induced connected graph. We will say a pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A are neighbors if {a, b} is an edge in the graphḠ(D). Agent i ∈ {1, 2} is said to be decisive over a ∈ A if for any P ∈ D 2 with r 1 (P i ) = a, f (P ) = a. Agent i ∈ {1, 2} is dictator if i is decisive over all alternatives in A.
Lemma 2 Let a and b be neighbors. For all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, if i is not decisive over a, then j is decisive over b.
Proof : We assume that agent i is not decisive over a. If agent i is not decisive over a, then we argue that f (P i ,P j ) = a, where r 1 (P i ) = a and r 1 (
2 such that r 1 (P i ) = a and r 1 (P j ) = b. In that case, we argue that agent i is decisive over a. Suppose not. Then there exists a profile
By Lemma 1 and our assumption, f
2 such that r 1 (P i ) = a and r 1 (P j ) = b. Finally, we argue that agent j is decisive over b. Suppose not. Then there exists a profile P ′ ∈ D 2 , such that
Lemma 3 For any distinct a and b in A, it is impossible that agent 1 is decisive over a and agent 2 is decisive over b.
Proof : Pick a profile P ∈ D 2 such that r 1 (P 1 ) = a and r 1 (P 2 ) = b. Since agent 1 is decisive over a, f (P ) = a. But f (P ) = b, because agent 2 is decisive over c. Therefore, the singlevaluedness of f is contradicted.
Proof of Part A: SupposeḠ(D) is not a star graph. We show that f is dictatorial. First we show the following claim.
Claim 8 For any a ∈ A, either agent 1 is decisive over a or agent 2 is decisive over a.
Proof : Suppose not. There exists an alternative a ∈ A such that either both the agents are decisive over a or none of them are decisive over a. We consider the following two cases.
Case 1: Suppose both the agents are decisive over a. SinceḠ(D) is connected and not a star, there exists two edges {a, b} and {b, c} where a = c. By Lemma 3, both the agents are not decisive over b. By Lemma 2, both the agents are decisive over c, because b and c are neighbors. Since agent 1 is decisive over a and 2 is decisive over b, Lemma 3 is contradicted.
Case 2: Suppose none of the agents are decisive over a. SinceḠ(D) is connected, there exists an edge {a, b} inḠ(D). By Lemma 2, both the agents are decisive over b. Arguments in case 1 can now be replicated with alternative a replaced by b to show a contradiction.
Claim 9 There exists an agent who is decisive over all alternatives in A.
Proof : Let a be any element of A. By Claim 8, either agent 1 is decisive over a or agent 2 is decisive over a. W.l.o.g we assume that agent 1 is decisive over a. We complete the proof by showing that 1 is decisive over all alternatives in A. Let b be any element of A \ {a}. We show that agent 1 is decisive over b. SinceḠ(D) is connected, there exists a path (a = a 1 , a 2 
First, we show that if agent 1 is decisive over a i then agent 1 is decisive over a i+1 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k −1} and applying this fact again and again we conclude that agent 1 is decisive over b. Note that a i and a i+1 are neighbors inḠ(D). By Lemma 3, if agent 1 is decisive over a i , then agent 2 is not decisive over a i+1 . By Claim 8, agent 1 is decisive over a i+1 . Therefore we conclude that agent 1 is decisive over b. Because b was arbitrary, agent 1 is decisive over all alternatives in A. Claim 10 It is impossible that agent 1 and 2 are both decisive over a.
Proof : Since b w ∼ c, there exists B ⊂ A and P 1 , P 2 ∈ D such that (i) r 1 (P 1 ) = b and r 1 (P 2 ) = c, (ii) B = M (b, c, P 1 ) and (iii) B = M (c, b, P 2 ). By Lemma 1, f (P 1 , P 2 ) is either b or c. Let f (P 1 , P 2 ) = b -a similar arguments works if f (P 1 , P 2 ) = c. If a ∈ B, 2 would manipulate at (P 1 , P 2 ) via an ordering where a is ranked first because 2 is decisive over aa contradiction.
Suppose a / ∈ B. Since a and c are neighbors, a w ∼ c. Therefore, there exists B ′ ⊂ A and P
. Lemma 1 and strategy-proofness imply that f (P 1 , P Proof : Replacing Claim 8 by Claim 14 in the proof of Claim 9, we can establish this Claim.
Claim 13-15 establish Part C of Theorem 3.
This completes the proof of the Theorem.
Observation 6 Since the graph induced by a circular domain is connected and not a star graph (Observation 3), Part A of Theorem 3 generalizes the results in Sato (2010) . Moreover, the minimal size of a γ domain is 2m (Example 2).
Observation 7 For the star-graph case, there are domains for which the conditions specified in Part B and Part C do not hold -the domain in Example 3 is such an example.
Observation 8 The relationship between linked domains (Aswal et al. (2003) ), circular domains (Sato (2010) ), circular domains (Chatterji and Sen (2011) ), β domains and γ domains is summarized as follows. 
An Application
Consider a city with a hub. A finite number of citizens are located in the city but not at the hub. However, their locations are directly connected to the hub by a road. A public facility such as a hospital or a school has to be located in the city. The location decision is based on the preferences of citizens which are private information. What are the scfs that induce agents to report their preferences truthfully? Let H be the hub of the city. Agents are located at a finite set of locations denoted by a 1 , . . . , a m , m ≥ 2. Agents' preferences are restricted in the following manner: an agent located at a i has one of the four orderings shown in The rationale behind the preference restrictions is as follows. Some citizens want it either at their location or at the hub -these citizens prefer proximity to the facility. Thus a i and H take first two places in their ordering and are represented either by P i or P ′ i . Some citizens want it at any residential location rather than at the hub and most prefer it when it is located near them -these preferences are represented byP i . Finally some citizens are affected by the congestion created by the facility and are strongly averse to it being located near them. They most prefer it being located at the hub for easy access. Such preferences are represented by P ′′ i . A domain with the four preference orderings in Table 5 
Conclusion
We have generalized the results of Aswal et al. (2003) in two different ways. Our results generate new examples of dictatorial domains and also unify existing results by covering some hitherto isolated cases.
